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ABSTRACT
While the degree of policy inertia in central banks’ reaction functions is a central ingredient in theoretical
and empirical monetary economics, the source of the observed policy inertia in the U.S. is controversial,
with tests of competing hypotheses such as interest-smoothing and persistent-shocks theories being
inconclusive. This paper employs real time data; nested specifications with flexible time series structures;
narratives; interest rate forecasts of the Fed, financial markets, and professional forecasters; and instrumental
variables to discriminate competing explanations of policy inertia. The presented evidence strongly
favors the interest-smoothing explanation and thus can help resolve a key puzzle in monetary economics.
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“In their discussion of the relative merits of smaller and more frequent adjustments versus larger and less 
frequent  adjustments  …,  [FOMC]  participants  generally  agreed  that  large  adjustments  had  been 
appropriate when economic activity was declining sharply in response to the financial crisis. In current 
circumstances,  however,  most  saw  advantages  to  a  more  incremental  approach  that  would  involve 
smaller changes …  calibrated to incoming data.”   
Minutes of the FOMC videoconference meeting, October 15
th, 2010. 
 
“The debate about the sources of gradualism is ongoing and I cannot hope to render a definitive 
verdict today on the relative merits of these rationales.” 
                       Ben Bernanke, May 20
th, 2004 Speech. 
 
I  Introduction 
As the U.S. economy slowly recovers from the deepest recession since the Great Depression, attention is 
increasingly turning to the Federal Reserve’s “exit strategy.”  At what pace will the Federal Reserve 
reverse measures deployed to combat the financial crisis, how rapidly will the Fed allow excess reserves 
to  be  drawn  down,  and  at  what  speed  will  interest  rates  rise  in  the  coming  years?    While  the  Fed 
demonstrated a willingness to act with remarkable speed in the heart of the financial crisis, central banks 
have traditionally been characterized as being subject to significant inertia in the policy-making process, 
consistent with the quote above.  In a 2004 speech devoted precisely to the question of monetary policy 
inertia,  then-Governor  Bernanke  noted  that  this  form  of  gradualism  (or  interest  rate  smoothing)  in 
monetary policy has several potential benefits: it may be optimal when policymakers are uncertain about 
the quantitative effects of policy changes (as in Brainard 1967), it gives policymakers more control over 
long-term interest rates via the expectations channel (Woodford 2003a), and it may reduce financial 
sector instability because of the increased predictability of interest rates.  While little evidence is available 
for  nontraditional  monetary  policy  actions,  a  long  literature  has  argued  that  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
historical interest rate decisions have followed precisely this modus operandi. Starting with Clarida et al. 
(2000), much of the literature characterizing the Fed’s historical reaction function has found that interest 
rate decisions can be closely replicated by modeling the current interest rate as a weighted average of the 
lagged interest rate and the desired interest rate for the central bank, where the latter depends on current 
and  expected  macroeconomic  conditions  as  in  Taylor  (1993),  with  empirical  estimates  consistently 
finding large weights on lagged interest rates consistent with the policy inertia motive. 
At the same time, the apparent willingness of the Federal Reserve to respond rapidly to certain 
episodes, particularly in its role of lender-of-last-resort such as after the 1987 stock market crash, suggests 
that this apparent conservatism in decision-making may be more fiction than fact.  This point has been 
made most forcibly by Rudebusch (2002, 2006) who argues that the inertia identified in previous work is 
likely a reflection of omitted variables in the Fed’s reaction function.  If the central bank reacts to factors 
other than those included in stylized Taylor rules, such as asset prices, liquidity conditions, or market 2 
 
uncertainty,  then  to  the  extent  that  these  variables  are  persistent,  this  will  misleadingly  lead  to  the 
appearance of inertia in estimated Taylor rules when none is in fact present.   Rudebusch documents that a 
standard Taylor rule augmented to include persistent shocks as a proxy for other factors is statistically 
indistinguishable from a reaction function characterized by interest smoothing.  Subsequent work using 
nested  specifications  with  both  policy  inertia  and  persistent shocks  has  confirmed  that  there  is  little 
statistical basis for rejecting either hypothesis, but that allowing for persistent shocks significantly lowers 
the estimated degree of monetary policy inertia.
1  In his speech on the topic, Bernanke summarizes the 
literature by concluding that this question remains unresolved. 
Yet breaking this empirical impasse and characterizing the inherent degree of inertia in monetary 
policy is important for a number of reasons.  First, the amount of policy inertia plays a key role in 
forecasting not just the unwinding of the Fed’s many actions during the financial crisis but the response of 
monetary  policymakers  to  shocks  more  generally.    For  example,  the  degree  of  policy  inertia  would 
significantly affect one’s forecast of the pace of the endogenous response of the central bank (and therefore 
of macroeconomic conditions more generally) to non-monetary policy innovations such as technology or 
oil price shocks.  Second, the underlying parameters of structural macroeconomic models are effectively 
estimated by comparing their predicted impulse responses to those observed in the data.  Understanding 
whether the conditional response of the economy to shocks is subject to policy inertia will therefore matter 
for the estimates of all parameters of the model, not just those related to the policy rule. Third, whether one 
assumes policy inertia or persistent shocks in the specification of the Fed’s reaction function matters for 
historical interpretations.  For example, we document in section 2 that the Taylor Principle would have 
been satisfied during the Greenspan era under the policy inertia specification, but not under the persistent 
shocks  view.    The  monetary  policy  interpretation  of  the  Great  Moderation  advocated  by  Lubik  and 
Schorfheide (2004) and others in which changes in the monetary policy rule during the Volcker and 
Greenspan eras moved the U.S. economy away from indeterminacy is therefore dependent on the assumed 
source of the persistence in  interest  rates.    Similarly,  Ireland  (2011) shows that  determining  whether 
interest rates were too accommodative in the mid-2000s, as suggested by Taylor (2007), hinges on the 
degree of policy inertia in the Fed’s reaction function. 
Using a variety of methods, we present new evidence which decisively favors the policy inertia 
interpretation of the Fed’s historical behavior.  First, we revisit empirical estimates of nested specifications 
of the Taylor rule which previous research has found to be unable to conclusively discriminate between the 
two hypotheses.  However, this prior research restricted interest smoothing and persistent shocks to first 
                                                      
1 English et al. (2003), Gerlach-Kristen (2004) and Consolo and Favero (2009) all estimate Taylor rules nesting both 
interest smoothing and persistent shocks using single-equation methods and report evidence for both motives, albeit to 
differing degrees.  Carrillo et al. (2007) and Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate nested specifications within fully 
specified structural macroeconomic models and also find evidence for both explanations. 3 
 
order autoregressive processes even though theoretical models of policy inertia suggest that higher order 
smoothing could be optimal (Woodford 2003b) and there is no a priori reason to believe that persistent 
shocks are best described as an AR(1) process.  By allowing for more general forms of each, we show that 
the data is much more informative about the underlying source of interest rate persistence than previously 
uncovered.  Using information criteria to select across a wide set of nested specifications with higher order 
interest  smoothing  and  persistent  shocks,  the  data  strongly  support  specifications  with  only  interest 
smoothing, with two lags of interest rates being the preferred specification.  In addition, we show that 
when one allows for second order interest smoothing in the Taylor rule, autoregressive parameters in the 
error term either become insignificantly different from zero or negative.   
Our  second  contribution  is  to  provide  a  new  method  to  test  the  relative  merit  of  the  two 
hypotheses.  The key insight is that while both interest smoothing and persistent monetary policy shocks 
can adequately account for the observed persistence in interest rates, they have different implications for 
the  conditional  response  of  interest  rates  to  non-monetary  policy  shocks.    Specifically,  interest  rate 
smoothing implies that an inertial policy response should be observable after any shock, whereas this 
should not be the case under persistent monetary shocks.  With the latter, the extra persistence in interest 
rates should obtain only after monetary policy shocks.  Thus, we propose to test the hypothesis that 
persistent interest rates reflect persistent monetary policy shocks by identifying the conditional response 
of policymakers to non-monetary policy shocks.  To do so, we employ an instrumental variables strategy 
in which our instruments are identified non-monetary policy shocks, including technology shocks, oil 
supply shocks, news shocks and exogenous fiscal shocks.  These instruments serve to identify historical 
innovations to the Federal Reserve’s forecasts of inflation, output growth and the output gap driven by 
shocks other than monetary policy.  As a result, they allow us to assess whether policy inertia is present in 
response to these shocks, a finding confirmed in the data.  All of the estimates of interest smoothing are 
high, close to those obtained under OLS, and statistically significant at standard levels.  Hence, this 
alternative approach also strongly supports the interest rate smoothing motive. 
  Our  third  contribution  is  to  revisit  the  primary  source  of  support  for  the  persistent  shocks 
explanation, namely the evidence provided by Rudebusch (2002) that future interest rate changes are 
largely unpredicted by financial market participants.  His key insight was that if policy inertia is as high 
as implied by typical Taylor rule estimates, then interest rate changes two to three quarters in the future 
should be fairly predictable given current information.  Using Eurodollar futures prices, he documents 
little predictability of interest rates at these horizons by financial market participants.  We present similar 
evidence  using  professional forecasts  of  future  short  term  interest  rate  changes.   However, there are 
several factors that could reduce the ability of private agents to forecast future interest rate changes even if 
policy inertia is strong.  First, there could be uncertainty on their part about the form of the policy rule, 4 
 
such as whether the central bank responds to the output gap or output growth, what measure of inflation it 
focuses on, or whether policy inertia is important.  Second, private agents typically have a more restricted 
information set than the Federal Reserve.  Third, even with the same information, agents may use different 
models than the staff of the Fed to formulate forecasts, leading to different predictions about the future path 
of policy.  Romer and Romer (2000), for example, document that Greenbook forecasts systematically 
outperform professional forecasters, which indicates that the Fed either has access to superior information 
about the economy or is more successful in converting that information into accurate forecasts.   
These informational constraints potentially facing private-sector forecasters imply that the extent 
to which these agents can predict subsequent interest rate changes may not be adequate to identify the 
presence of policy inertia.  On the other hand, the Federal Reserve staff should be better able to predict 
future interest rate changes because internal members of the Fed are more likely to correctly identify the 
policy rule and employ the same information as that utilized by the FOMC in its interest rate decisions.  
As  a  result,  we revisit the  predictability  of interest  rate  changes  using  the  assumptions about  future 
Federal Funds Rates and other short-term interest rates made by the Fed staff in generating the Greenbook 
forecasts as proxies for their expectations of future interest rates.  Because these need not represent the 
staff’s  unconditional  best  forecasts  of  future  interest  rates,  they  provide  only  a  lower  bound  on  the 
predictability of future interest rates changes by members of the Federal Reserve.  Despite this, we find 
that the Greenbook assumptions about the path of future interest rates can predict a larger fraction of 
future interest rate changes (both Fed Funds Rate and 3-month T-Bill rate) than private sector forecasts, 
and that these forecasts are unbiased even at two and three quarter forecasting horizons, unlike private 
sector forecasts.  Thus, we find that even the empirical strategy which previously yielded the strongest 
evidence for persistent shocks is actually consistent with the presence of significant inertia in historical 
interest rate decisions. 
Further evidence that the inability of private agents to forecast interest rates as well as the Fed 
likely reflects informational constraints comes from the fact that when we extend the end of the sample 
from 1999 to the mid-2000’s, both financial market and professional forecasts are better able to predict 
future interest rate changes even though the overall predictability of interest rates, as measured by the 
Greenbook  forecasts’  accuracy,  is  unchanged  over  this  extended  time  period.    This  is  suggestive  of 
informational constraints on private sector forecasters because the Fed began to include statements about 
its perceptions of future risks after each FOMC meeting in 2000.  These statements likely provided an 
important  guide to the  private  sector  as  to  the likely  direction  of  future interest rate changes  which 
resulted in an improvement in their ability to predict the path of policy decisions.   
Our fourth approach is to consider the statements of policymakers themselves about the interest-
rate setting process.  We present suggestive narrative evidence from FOMC discussions during which 5 
 
monetary policymakers explicitly framed their decisions in a policy smoothing context.  In particular, we 
focus on the 1994-1995 period when the Federal Reserve significantly raised interest rates to preempt a 
resurgence of inflation.  During internal policy discussions in this period, Greenspan and other FOMC 
members made explicit statements about their perceptions of the optimal level of interest rates but made no 
suggestions to move directly to these levels.  Instead, any disagreement among FOMC members was 
almost exclusively about the speed at which interest rates should move toward the desired level, with the 
consensus view favoring a very gradual adjustment of policy rates toward desired levels.  A similar pattern 
occurred in 2004 as the Federal Reserve began systematically raising interest rates after a prolonged period 
of low interest rates.  Then-Governor Bernanke clearly advocated—both in FOMC meetings and in his 
May 20
th, 2004 speech—a gradual process for raising interest rates which is not only consistent with the 
policy inertia interpretation but also strongly suggests that the unwinding of the Fed’s accommodative 
stance is again likely to be “measured” (2004 Fed speak) and “incremental” (2010 Fed speak). 
 Finally, we consider the broader possibility that the excess persistence observed in interest rates 
relative to the predictions of simple Taylor rules is the result of of the Federal Reserve responding to 
factors other than those traditionally included in the reaction function.  Controlling for different measures 
of  financial  market  conditions,  the  estimated  degree  of  interest  smoothing  is  unaffected.    Similarly, 
controlling for the revisions in the Fed’s forecasts also does not qualitatively affect the results.  A third 
possibility is that the missing persistence could stem from a time-varying inflation target.  Using different 
target  inflation  measures  from  Cogley  et  al. (2010),  Ireland (2007) and  Coibion  and  Gorodnichenko 
(2011), we again find that the estimated degree of interest smoothing is unchanged while the role of 
persistent policy shocks is diminished.  We also document that any evidence of persistent policy shocks 
disappears  after  we  incorporate  into  the  Taylor  rule  the  difference  between  Greenbook  and  private 
consensus  forecasts  thus  suggesting  that  the  serial  correlation  in  policy  shocks  may  simply  reflect 
informational flows between agents.  This would be consistent with the notion that the central bank 
utilizes the information in private forecasts along with its internal forecasts as well as the possibility that 
the central bank considers how private forecasters may try to learn about the central bank’s information 
from its policy actions or announcements.  Once these factors are incorporated in the estimated policy 
reaction function, interest rate smoothing may be reasonably described as AR(1) rather than a higher 
order autoregressive process.  Hence, these results suggest that the correlated policy shocks found in the 
previous work may have stemmed from movements in unobservable targets and/or sensitivity on the part 
of policymakers to the private sector’s expectations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents preliminary evidence on the 
performance of estimated Taylor rules assuming either interest rate smoothing or persistent shocks and 
illustrates how simple nested specifications do not convincingly differentiate between the two in the data.  6 
 
Section 3 considers more general forms of interest smoothing and persistent shocks and documents that 
interest  rate  smoothing  is  strongly  preferred  to  persistent  shocks  once  one  allows  for  higher  order 
descriptions of each process.  Section 4 proposes and applies an instrumental variable procedure to assess 
the support for the two explanations of interest rate persistence while section 5 presents new evidence on 
the predictability of interest rate changes by private agents versus Federal Reserve forecasts.  Section 6 
considers narrative evidence about policymakers’ decisions and section 7 allows for the possibility of 
other factors being responsible for the persistence in interest rates.  Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
II  Interest Rate Smoothing vs. Persistent Monetary Policy Shocks 
In  this  section,  we  first  consider  simple  versions  of  Taylor  rules  with  interest  rate  smoothing  and/or 
persistent  monetary  policy  shocks  using  real-time  measures  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  forecasts  of 
macroeconomic conditions.  We document the near statistical equivalence of reaction functions with either 
interest smoothing or persistent shocks despite their remarkably different implications for the historical 
behavior of the Federal Reserve.  In addition, we show that nested specifications relying on first-order 
autoregressive specifications of each motive fail to decisively differentiate between the two hypotheses. 
 
2.1  Baseline Evidence on the Sources of Persistent Interest Rate Changes 
Since  Taylor  (1993),  macroeconomists  have  relied  on  simple  interest  rate  reaction  functions  to 
characterize the endogenous response of monetary policy-makers to economic fluctuations.  While early 
work assumed that policy-makers responded to contemporaneous inflation and output gaps, more recent 
work has emphasized the importance of controlling for the real-time expectations of the central bank 
(Orphanides 2003, Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2011).  In this spirit, we consider the following baseline 
specification for monetary policy-makers’ desired interest rate (  
∗) 
  
∗ =   +          +            +          +      (1) 
where E denotes the central bank’s forecast of macroeconomic variables, π is inflation, dy is the growth 
rate of output, and x is the output gap.  The rule allows for the central bank to respond to the forecast of 
future macroeconomic variables (horizon h), consistent with the notion that monetary policy changes take 
time to affect the economy so policy-makers should be forward-looking in their policy decisions.  The 
rule also departs from the classical Taylor (1993) specification in that it allows for responses to both the 
output  gap  and  the  growth  rate  of  output,  a  feature  that  receives  strong  empirical  support  as  first 
documented in Ireland (2004). 
  For  example,  estimating  this  rule  by  OLS  from  1987Q4  until  2004Q4  using  the  Greenbook 
forecasts prepared by the staff of the Federal Reserve before each FOMC meeting and the target Federal 
Funds Rate (FFR) for the interest rate yields 7 
 




      ,   − 0.11
 0.09 
     + 0.64 
 0.07 
     +    
   = 0.75,         = 0.89 
where Newey-West HAC standard errors are in parentheses.
2  As emphasized by Taylor (1993), a simple 
specification such as this can account for much of the policy changes over this time period, with an R
2 of 
nearly 90%.  The point estimate on inflation is greater than one, implying that the Federal Reserve 
satisfied the Taylor rule over this time period, while also responding with higher interest rates to rising 
output gaps.  The response to output growth is not significantly different from zero.  Figure 1 plots the 
actual time path of the target FFR over this time period, the predicted time path from the estimated 
reaction function, as well as the residuals from the regression, illustrating how well the Taylor rule can 
account for historical policy changes over this time period.  However, the predictions of the Taylor rule 
are noticeably more volatile than actual interest rates: the average size of the predicted change in interest 
rates (in absolute value) is approximately sixty percent larger than actual changes in interest rates (57bp to 
35bp).  Actual interest rates are also significantly more persistent than predicted interest rates (AR(1) 
parameter of 0.98 versus 0.93).  Finally, the residuals are serially correlated: the Durbin-Watson statistic 
is well under 1 and we can reject the null of no serial correlation of the residuals at standard levels.   
  The often-noted gradualism in actual interest rate targets has led many to adopt an alternative 
representation of monetary policy actions, in which the actual interest rate is a weighted average of the 
current desired rate and the previous period’s interest rate: 
   =        +  1 −      
∗ 
where ρi is the degree of interest rate smoothing.  This type of inertia in monetary policy implies that 
central bankers will move interest rates toward their desired levels in a sequence of steps rather than in an 
immediate fashion as predicted by the baseline Taylor rule.  Estimating this equation by OLS using the 
same data and time period as before yields 




      ,   + 0.18
 0.03 
     + 0.14
  0.02 
     + 0.82 
 0.03 
     +    
   = 0.26,         = 0.99 
The implied long-run response to inflation (0.42/(1-0.82)) is greater than 2 so that the Taylor Principle was 
satisfied by the Federal Reserve.  Allowing for interest smoothing yields a positive estimated response of 
interest rates to both the output gap and output growth.  The estimated degree of interest rate smoothing of 
0.82 is similar to those found in the literature, such as Clarida et al. (2000) and points to a very significant 
degree of policy inertia.  Allowing for interest smoothing raises the ability of the specification to account 
for historical policy changes by a significant amount, with the R
2 rising to 99%.  Furthermore, allowing for 
                                                      
2 For all quarterly estimates of the Taylor rule, we use data from the meeting closest to the middle of each quarter.  
We find similar results using data at the frequency of FOMC meetings. 8 
 
interest smoothing eliminates much of the serial correlation in the residuals.  For these reasons, interest 
smoothing  has  become  a  central  feature  of  how  monetary  policy  rules  are  characterized  in  modern 
macroeconomic models that play an increasingly important role in policy analysis. 
  An  alternative  explanation  for  the  apparent  inertia  in  interest  rates  suggested  by  Rudebusch 
(2002) is that it reflects persistent monetary policy shocks (or persistent deviations from the Taylor rule) 
rather than policy inertia.  Under this interpretation, policy follows the Taylor rule in equation (1) but the 
shocks to the interest rate follow a persistent process such as  
   =        +    
Applying the same data and time sample, we re-estimate equation (1) allowing for AR(1) errors and find 




      ,   − 0.05
 0.03 
     + 0.47
  0.11 
    +  ,       =  0.98
 0.03 
     +    
   = 0.39,         = 0.97 
As  with the  specification under interest smoothing,  we  find strong  evidence for  extra persistence in 
interest rates, in this case measured by an autoregressive parameter of 0.98 for the error term.  Allowing 
for persistent errors also significantly improves the fit of the empirical specification, with the R
2 rising to 
97%, and eliminates much of the serial correlation in the error   .  Strikingly, the implied response of 
interest rates to inflation is strictly less than one, suggesting that the Federal Reserve may not have 
satisfied  the Taylor  Principle  during  the  Greenspan era, a  finding  which is in  sharp  contrast  to that 
obtained under the baseline Taylor rule or the rule augmented with interest smoothing.   
  Figure 2 plots the actual target Federal Funds Rate over this time period as well the predicted levels 
from the specifications with either interest-smoothing or persistent shocks.  As can readily be seen, the two 
specifications are nearly indistinguishable to the naked eye and both interest rate smoothing and persistent 
monetary policy shocks are able to account for the excessive volatility of interest rate changes predicted by 
the baseline Taylor rule, improve the fit of the empirical reaction function, and control for much of the 
observed persistent deviations of actual interest rates from the predicted rates of the baseline Taylor rule.  
Yet, as discussed above, determining whether the persistence of interest rates reflects interest rate smoothing 
or persistent shocks is a crucial determinant in a variety of macroeconomic analyses.  
 
2.2  The Limited Informativeness of Nested Specifications 
Because both approaches appear to fit the data so well, empirically determining the relative importance of 
interest rate smoothing and persistent shocks has been challenging.  Rudebusch (2002) proposes a nested 
specification 
   =   +          +            +          +        +   ,        =        +      (2) 9 
 
but finds that the data are not sufficiently informative to reject either hypothesis and that small changes to 
the time period under consideration can lead to evidence that favors either hypothesis.  Subsequent work 
using this approach has yielded similar results.  English et al. (2003) find that both serially correlated 
shocks and interest rate smoothing are important, while Gerlach-Kristen (2004) similarly finds a role for 
both mechanisms but indicates that interest smoothing appears to be less important than suggested by the 
previous literature.  Carrillo et al. (2007) use a structural macroeconomic model to estimate the Taylor 
rule and again document evidence for both mechanisms, but like Gerlach-Kristen, they argue that serially 
correlated shocks significantly reduce the importance of policy inertia. 
  One limitation common to each of these studies is their reliance on ex-post data rather than the 
ex-ante expectations of the Federal Reserve.  As emphasized by Orphanides (2003), controlling for the 
real-time information available to central bankers, particularly in terms of measurements of the output 
gap, can significantly affect the historical interpretation of policy decisions.  As a result, we estimate 
nested specifications, with results reported in Table 1.  The point estimate for the degree of interest rate 
smoothing  is  0.81,  almost  identical  to  the  original  specification  without  persistent  shocks,  and  is 
statistically  significantly  different  from  zero.    The  coefficient  on  the  persistence  of  monetary  policy 
shocks,  however,  is  now  much  lower  at  0.46  but  remains  statistically  different  from  zero.    Hence, 
conditional on the Federal Reserve’s real-time information set, the data favors the interest smoothing 
motive over the persistent shock interpretation, but does not unambiguously reject either specification.  
Thus,  like  much  of  the  previous  literature,  we  find  that  a  simple  nested  specification  cannot 
overwhelmingly differentiate between the two explanations. 
  Table 1 presents additional results of the nested Taylor rule using different specifications of the 
Taylor rule.  For example, using the Greenbook forecast of inflation in the next quarter rather than in the 
next two quarters (column 2) does not qualitatively affect the results.  However, as noted by Rudebusch 
(2002), the results of the nested specifications are generally not very robust.  For example, assuming that 
the central bank responds to the forecast of the current quarter’s inflation rate (column 5), the coefficient 
on interest smoothing declines to 0.70 while the persistence of monetary policy shocks is now estimated 
to be 0.89.  Thus, this specification points to a stronger role for persistent shocks, although both the AIC 
and SIC indicate that our baseline specification is statistically preferred to one in which the central bank is 
assumed to respond to contemporaneous inflation.  Similarly, allowing for a response to expected output 
growth in the next quarter rather than the current quarter or eliminating the response to output growth 
altogether (columns 3 and 4) leads to higher point estimates of the persistence of monetary policy shocks.  
In  all  cases,  we  can  reject  the  null  of  either  interest  smoothing  or  persistent  shocks  being  the  sole 
mechanism that accounts for the excess persistence in interest rates observed in the data. 10 
 
  Table 2 presents additional results from estimating our preferred specification of the Taylor rule 
over different time periods.  First, if we restrict the time sample to end in 1999Q4, as in Rudebusch 
(2002),  the  results  are  almost  identical:  we  find  evidence  for  both  interest smoothing  and  persistent 
shocks, although the coefficient on interest smoothing is much larger than the estimated persistence of the 
shocks.  Extending the sample to 1983Q1 strengthens the case for interest-smoothing, as the estimated 
persistence of monetary policy shocks falls and becomes insignificantly different from zero.  Table 2 also 
includes  results  when  we  estimate  the  baseline  Taylor  rule  at  the  frequency  of  FOMC  meetings, 
approximately every six weeks over this time period, rather than at the quarterly frequency.  Over the 
Greenspan period, the results point more strongly toward the interest smoothing motive: the coefficients 
on lagged interest rates are around 0.90 and statistically significant at conventional levels, while the 
estimated  persistence  of  monetary  shocks  is  small  and  insignificantly  different  from  zero.    One 
interpretation  of  these  results  is  that  previous  work,  having  focused  exclusively  on  analysis  at  the 
quarterly frequency, may have overstated the evidence of persistent shocks.  Using the entire post-1982 
era yields slightly more mixed evidence, with the autoregressive parameter governing the dynamics of the 
error term becoming positive and statistically significant at the 10% level.  Thus, across specifications and 
time periods, the results are remarkably mixed: while most of the specifications point to an important role 
for policy inertia, it is difficult to systematically rule out persistent shocks as an alternative explanation 
for the interest rate inertia apparent in the data. 
 
III  Generalized Specifications of Interest Rate Smoothing and Persistent Shocks 
While the evidence from the previous section suggests that interest rate smoothing is a somewhat more 
potent explanation for the persistence of interest rate changes observed in the data than persistent shocks, 
the evidence is mixed at best as minor variations in the specification of the Taylor rule can move the 
relative importance of the two mechanisms substantially.  However, an important caveat is that, like 
previous work, we have only considered the simplest forms of each specification, namely first-order 
autoregressive specifications for both interest rate smoothing and persistent monetary policy shocks.  On 
the other hand, other work on estimating Taylor rules has identified evidence that interest smoothing 
could be higher order: Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011), for example, find that interest smoothing is 
best  characterized  as  a  second  order  autoregressive  process  but  do  not  consider  the  possibility  that 
monetary policy shocks are persistent.  Furthermore, Woodford (2003b) proves that the optimal interest 
rate rule should have an AR(2) interest rate smoothing and, therefore, there are theoretical arguments to 
have interest rate smoothing with higher autoregressive orders.  There is also no a priori reason to suspect 
that the persistence of monetary policy shocks, or more broadly deviations from the Taylor rule, is best 11 
 
characterized as a first order autoregressive process.  In this section, we allow for higher order processes 
for both interest smoothing and persistent shocks, i.e. we consider empirical specifications of the form 
   =   +          +            +          +     
 
         +   ,   (3) 
   =     ,     
 
    +   .  
We assess the relative merit of interest rate smoothing and persistent shocks using two methods.  
First, we compute the BIC criteria associated with the same specifications of the desired interest rate as in 
the previous section, but now allowing both I and J to range from zero to four.  Thus, we include 
specifications with only interest-smoothing, only persistent shocks, neither, and a variety of specifications 
with both interest-smoothing and persistent shocks.  As a result, this kind of model-selection criterion can 
shed some light on the relative merit of the two approaches while allowing for more general forms of both 
interest smoothing and persistent shocks than in the previous section.  The results are presented in Table 3 
for different time periods using data at both the quarterly frequency and the FOMC meetings frequency.  
The results strongly favor the interest smoothing motive: all but one of the specifications of the Taylor 
rule estimated at the quarterly frequency achieve the lowest BIC with two lags of the interest rate and no 
persistence in monetary policy shocks.  The sole exception, when the central bank is assumed not to 
respond  to  output  growth,  yields  a  specification  with  one  lag  of  the  interest  rate  and  first-order 
autoregressive shocks.  However, the BIC for this specification of the Taylor rule is substantially higher 
than for versions of the Taylor rule which include output growth.  The results using data at the frequency 
of the FOMC meetings are similar.  Most of the preferred specifications since 1987 include no persistent 
shocks.  Only when the time period is extended to 1983 do we find some evidence for persistent shocks. 
As a second approach, we present results from estimating equation (3) assuming two lags of the 
interest rate and a second order autoregressive process for monetary policy shocks for each of the Taylor 
rule specifications considered before over the time period 1987Q4 to 2004Q4.  These results are in Table 4.  
Consistent with the results in Table 3, both interest rate lags are statistically significant for each of the 
Taylor rule specifications, and the sum of the coefficients is between 0.75 and 0.95 so that the degree of 
interest  smoothing  is  always  high.    On  the  other  hand,  the  first  autoregressive  parameter  for  shock 
persistence is never statistically different from zero, while the second autoregressive parameter, when 
different from zero, is negative.
3  Hence, whereas previous work has found that nested specifications could 
not decisively differentiate between the two explanations for interest rate persistence, we find that once one 
allows for higher order interest smoothing, the evidence robustly favors the interest smoothing motive.  In 
addition,  one  should  note  that  the  fact  that  second-order  interest  smoothing  fares  well  in  the  data  is 
qualitatively consistent with the optimal interest smoothing rules in Woodford (2003b).  However, the 
                                                      
3 Similar results obtain using higher order autoregressive specifications of the error term: the coefficients are either 
insignificantly different from zero or negative. 12 
 
point estimates differ quantitatively from optimal policy inertia: Woodford (2003b) shows that an optimal 
interest rate rule would be super-inertial, a feature which is consistently absent in our empirical estimates 
of historical reaction functions. 
   
IV  Conditional Monetary Policy Reaction Functions 
While the nested specifications lend greater support to the interest rate smoothing motive than previously 
noted, we want to consider alternative approaches which might shed light more directly on what the 
underlying source of persistent interest rate changes is.  In this section, we consider a novel test of the two 
hypotheses.  If the persistence of interest rate changes observed in the data is primarily driven by persistent 
monetary policy shocks, then the conditional response of interest rates should be slow after monetary 
policy shocks but not other macroeconomic shocks.  Intuitively, interest rate smoothing implies policy 
inertia regardless of the source of the underlying fluctuations, whereas the persistent monetary policy 
shocks explanation imposes additional interest rate persistence in response only to monetary policy shocks.   
  To see this more formally, note that after log-linearization and solving for the rational expectations 
solution, variables (z) in macroeconomic models can generically be expressed in MA(∞) form  
       =       ,   ,   
 
   
 
       (4) 
where i refers to periods and ε refers to structural shocks denoted by s, here ordered numerically from 1 to 
S.  We can then define the component of z driven by monetary policy shocks as 
      
   =     ,     ,   
 
       (5) 
and the component driven by all other shocks as 
      
    =        −       
     (6) 
Assuming structural shocks are uncorrelated with each other and across time, then the component of z 
driven by exogenous monetary policy shocks and that driven by all other shocks will be uncorrelated as 
well.  The desired interest rate can then be expressed as 
   =   
    +   
   +      (7) 
which decomposes changes in the desired interest rate into two components capturing the endogenous 
responses of monetary policy to macroeconomic fluctuations (  
    for non-monetary policy shock driven 
fluctuations and   
   for monetary-policy driven fluctuations) and the exogenous shocks to interest rates (u).    
This  decomposition  provides  an  alternative  approach  to  assess  the  source  of  the  interest  rate 
persistence in the data.  In the case with persistent monetary policy shocks but no interest smoothing, the 
endogenous  response  of  interest  rates  to  non-monetary  policy  shocks  should  not  be  subject  to  excess 
persistence, whereas under interest smoothing, the need for additional persistence should be apparent in 
response to non-monetary policy shocks.  This insight can be applied to the analysis of the Taylor rule if one 13 
 
can identify variations in the endogenous response of interest rates to shocks other than monetary policy.  
This can be done by instrumental variables estimation of the Taylor rule, using exogenous structural shocks 
as instruments.  The latter will be uncorrelated with monetary policy shocks and the endogenous response of 
interest rates to policy shocks (  
   +   ), thereby allowing us to assess whether interest smoothing is 
present in the face of non-monetary policy driven fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions.
4 
  To apply this method to historical monetary policy, we estimate equation (3) using instrumental 
variables.    Specifically,  our  instruments  are  permanent  technology  shocks  from  Gali  (1999),  purified 
innovations to the Solow residual as in Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2006), news shocks as in Beaudry and 
Portier (2006), oil supply shocks as identified by Kilian (2009), and tax shocks from Romer and Romer 
(2010).    We  could  not  reject  the  null  that  these  non-monetary  shocks  are  uncorrelated  with  popular 
measures of monetary shocks identified via a conventional VAR approach or as in Romer and Romer 
(2004)  and  the  overidentifying  restrictions  test  could  not  reject  the  null  that  the  instruments  are 
uncorrelated with the error term in the estimated equation.  Therefore, one may reasonably expect that the 
exclusion restriction is satisfied for our instrumental variables.  Results from applying this procedure to 
different time samples at the quarterly frequency are presented in Table 5.
5  In each case, the coefficient on 
interest smoothing is high, on the order of 0.8, and statistically different from zero.  Hence, inertia in policy 
actions exists in response to variations in macroeconomic conditions arising from non-monetary policy 
shocks.  This result indicates that interest-rate smoothing likely does not simply reflect persistent monetary 
policy shocks, but rather captures a fundamental component of the policy process of the Federal Reserve, 
consistent with the results using nested specifications of interest smoothing and persistent shocks. 
 
 V  Predictability of Interest Rate Changes 
While the evidence from the analysis of Taylor rules using real-time data clearly favors the interest-
smoothing explanation, Rudebusch (2002) suggests an alternative metric to assess the two explanations 
which he argues is consistent with the persistent shocks interpretation.  His insight is that if policy was 
driven by interest rate smoothing, then interest rate changes should be quite predictable.  Using futures 
markets for interest rates, he finds that markets are quantitatively unable to predict future interest rate 
changes, a result that he argues is difficult to reconcile with policy inertia.   
  The  specific  test  employed  by  Rudebusch  (2002)  consists  of  the  following  empirical 
specification: 
                                                      
4 We verified in Monte Carlo simulations that IV estimation of the Taylor rule using exogenous shocks as 
instruments could correctly identify the absence of interest smoothing when the data generating process is driven 
entirely by persistent shocks.  Results available upon request. 
5 We do not present equivalent results at the FOMC meetings frequency because most of the shocks used as 
instruments are only available at the quarterly frequency. 14 
 
     −        =   +      ,    −    ,       +      (8) 
where    ,    are the interest rate on Eurodollar deposits during quarter t+h that is expected at the end of 
quarter t.  Eurodollar futures have been the trading vehicle of choice for hedging short-run interest rate 
movements since the mid-1980s and therefore provide one measure of financial market participants’ 
forecasts  of  future  interest  rate  changes.    Assuming  a  constant  risk  premium  (incorporated  in  the 
intercept), efficient markets and full information on the part of market participants imply a null hypothesis 
of   = 1.  Furthermore, if interest rate decisions exhibit significant inertia, then market forecasts should 
be able to predict a non-trivial component of future interest rate changes.   
  In  Table  6,  we  reproduce  the  original  results  of  Rudebusch  (2002)  over  the  time  sample  of 
1987Q4  to  1999Q4.    At  the  one  quarter  ahead  forecasting  horizon,  β  is  not  different  from  one  but 
significantly greater than zero.  With an R
2 of more than 50%, this indicates that markets are able to 
predict short-term changes in the FFR quite well.  However, as emphasized by Rudebusch (2002), these 
results  rapidly  deteriorate  at  longer  forecasting  horizons.    At  the  two  and  three  quarter  forecasting 
horizons,  the  null  of  β  =  1  can  be  rejected  and  the  R
2’s  fall  to  11%  and  3%  respectively.    Using 
simulations from a New Keynesian model with a Taylor rule containing interest smoothing, Rudebusch 
finds that such a low predictability of future interest rate changes is an unlikely outcome, i.e. outside the 
95% confidence intervals of R
2 from the simulations, for levels of interest smoothing like those estimated 
in the data.  Thus, the low predictability of interest rates at the two and three quarter forecasting horizons 
suggests that policy inertia may not be the key driving source of interest rate persistence in the data. 
  On the other hand, there are several factors which could, even in the presence of policy inertia, lead 
financial market futures to be poor predictors of subsequent interest rates.  One such factor emphasized by 
Rudebusch  (2002) is the  possibility  of  a  time-varying  risk  premium.    But  there  are  also  a  number  of 
informational constraints facing private sector forecasters which could systematically reduce their ability to 
predict future interest rate decisions by the Fed even in the presence of significant policy inertia.  One such 
constraint is uncertainty about what the policy rule actually is, e.g. does the central bank respond to output 
growth or the output gap, by how much does the central respond to different macroeconomic variables, is 
there policy inertia in the decision making process, etc.  Second, private agents could have less information 
than the Federal Reserve.  The Federal Reserve has a much larger staff of economists available to digest and 
process  incoming  economic  information  than  any  private  organization,  likely  leaving  the  latter  at  an 
informational disadvantage.  Evidence of this is documented by Romer and Romer (2000) in the case of 
professional forecasters: they find that Greenbook forecasts systematically outperform professional forecasts 
of inflation.  Ang et al. (2007) show that professional forecasts of inflation dominate asset-price based 
forecasts  of  inflation,  so  Greenbook  forecasts  likely  have  a  significant  informational  advantage  over 
financial market forecasts.  Finally, agents could be unsure about the underlying model used by the Federal 15 
 
Reserve to translate its information set into forecasts of macroeconomic variables.  In this case, even if 
agents had the same information about current and past macroeconomic conditions, this might lead them to 
generate different forecasts than the Federal Reserve, which would translate into additional interest rate 
prediction errors.  As a result, the inability of financial market participants to forecast future interest rate 
changes could reflect a variety of factors other than a lack of policy inertia. 
  To evaluate the importance of these factors, we re-assess the predictability of future interest rate 
changes using the forecasts of the FFR embodied in the Greenbook forecasts of the Federal Reserve.  The 
staff  of  the  Board  of  Governors  makes  assumptions  about the future path  of the  FFR  in  generating 
forecasts of other macroeconomic variables, which can be interpreted as forecasts of future policy actions.  
Because these forecasts are generated at the same time as the forecasts of other macroeconomic variables 
in  the  Greenbooks,  they  should  embed  consistent  assumptions  about  the  policy  rule,  consistent 
information sets,  and  a  consistent  model  used  to  convert  information into forecasts.    In  short,  these 
forecasts of the FFR should possess much more information about the predictability of interest rates 
driven by policy inertia than market forecasts.  However, because these assumptions do not necessarily 
represent the staff’s best unconditional forecasts of future policy actions, they should be interpreted as a 
lower bound on the ability of Federal Reserve staff to predict subsequent policy decisions.  Figure 3 plots 
the historical FFR and selected forecasts from both financial markets and the Greenbooks (from the first 
quarter of each year).  Overall, forecasts from the Greenbooks seem to dominate other forecasts.  Only 
since 2000 do the financial market forecasts appear to do nearly as well as Greenbook forecasts. 
  Table  6  shows  the  estimated  parameters  from  estimating  equation  (8)  using  the  Greenbook 
assumptions about future interest rates in lieu of financial market forecasts over the same time sample.  The 
results are in stark contrast to those obtained using financial market forecasts.  Even at the two and three 
quarter forecasting horizons, the point estimates of β are very close to one and statistically different from 
zero at standard levels.  The R
2 of 20% and 12% at the two and three quarter ahead forecasting horizons are 
also significantly higher than obtained using financial market forecasts and lie within the 95% confidence 
intervals constructed by Rudebusch (2002) that one would expect to find in the presence of substantial 
policy inertia.  This result implies that future interest rate changes are in fact approximately as predictable as 
one would expect under significant interest rate smoothing, conditional on having sufficient information 
about the policy rule and macroeconomic conditions.  The inability of financial market forecasts to predict 
future interest rate changes is thus likely to primarily reflect variations in the risk premium or informational 
constraints, not an absence of inertia in interest rate setting decisions.  Thus, the ability of Federal Reserve 
staff to predict future changes in interest rates is further evidence that interest smoothing is an inherent 
component of the policy-making process rather than a statistical artifact of estimated Taylor rules. 16 
 
  We  also  produce analogous results for changes  in  3-month T-Bill rates  using  the  Greenbook 
forecasts of the latter as well as the median forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).  
Professional forecasts present an additional source of information about the ability of private agents to 
forecast  future  policy  changes  and  are  typically  of  high  quality:  Ang  et  al.  (2007)  document  that 
professional forecasts of inflation outperform most time series models and financial market forecasts.  
Figure 3 plots the 3-month T-Bill rate, along with forecasts from professional forecasters and Greenbooks.  
While the SPF appear to do better than financial market forecasts, the Greenbooks still appear to give 
better forecasts of the path of future interest rates.  The empirical results from estimating equation (8) using 
both SPF and Greenbook forecasts of the 3-month T-Bill rate, presented in Table 6, are qualitatively 
similar to those using FFR forecasts.  Professional forecasters, like financial market participants, are unable 
to  predict  interest  rate  changes  much  beyond  the  one  quarter  ahead  forecasting  horizon,  while  the 
Greenbook forecasts continue to yield point estimates of β which are significantly greater than zero and 
close to one, with R
2’s of the same order as that obtained using financial market forecasts.   
  The inability of financial markets and professional forecasters to predict future interest rates as 
well as the Federal Reserve during this time period has also been noted, albeit informally, by Fed insiders 
as illustrated by Blinder (1998) 
“Here are two clear examples from recent U.S. history.  I was not at the Federal Reserve in late 
1993 and early 1994, just before it started tightening monetary policy.  But I am fairly certain that 
the  Fed’s own  expectations  of future  Federal funds rates  were  well  above  those  presumably 
embedded in the term structure at the time, which seemed stuck at the unsustainably low level of 
3%.  A year later, I was at the Fed and I am certain that the market’s expectations of how high the 
funds rate was likely to go – to as high as 8% according to various asset prices and Wall Street 
predictions – were well above my own.  In both cases, the markets got it wrong – once on the 
high side and once on the low side.  In both cases, the faulty estimate was largely attributable to 
misapprehensions about the Fed’s intentions.  And in both cases, the bond market swung wildly 
when it corrected.  Such misapprehensions can never be eliminated, but they can be reduced by a 
central bank that offers markets a clearer vision of its goals, its ‘model’ of the economy, and its 
general strategy.” 
Blinder  attributes  the  superior  forecasting  ability  of  Fed  forecasts  to  informational  factors:  a  better 
understanding of the Fed’s model and the basis for its forecasts, as well as the policy objectives and the 
way in which policymakers respond to incoming information.  This recognition that greater transparency 
on the part of the central bank could help financial markets and other economic agents better forecast 
future policies, thereby stabilizing expectations, played an important role in increasing the information 
released by the Federal Reserve during this time period.  For example, the Federal Reserve began to 17 
 
release post-FOMC meeting statements in 1994 and augmented this with statements about the perceived 
balance of risks in 2000.
6   
One way to assess the importance of these informational constraints on the part of both financial 
market participants and professional forecasters is to compare their forecasting performance with respect 
to the Fed using a longer sample when communications from the Fed were expanded.  Table 6 therefore 
presents estimates of equation (8) for each type of forecast for the extended time sample of 1987Q4 to 
2004Q4.  The results using the Greenbook forecasts are qualitatively unchanged, with estimates of β 
remaining close to one at all forecasting horizons and R
2’s of similar, if slightly lower, magnitudes.  The 
results for financial market and professional forecasts, on the other hand, are improved relative to the 
period ending in 1999.  Coefficient estimates on forecasted changes are consistently closer to one and the 
R
2’s are all larger than over the restricted sample.  Thus, the ability of financial markets and professional 
forecasters to predict subsequent interest rate changes went up after the increased information disclosures 
on the part of the Fed, even though the overall predictability of interest rates, as measured by the Fed’s 
own forecasts, was largely unchanged.   
In short, these results suggest several conclusions.  First, the Federal Reserve’s ability to forecast 
subsequent interest rate changes is consistent with the presence of significant policy inertia.  Second, the 
inability of financial markets and professional forecasters to predict interest rates as well as the Federal 
Reserve during the sample studied by Rudebusch likely reflects informational constraints on these agents 
such as more limited information sets and uncertainty about the policy rule, not the absence of inertia in 
policy.  This point is consistent with the evidence from a longer time period during which the Federal 
Reserve  expanded  its  communications:  even  though  the  overall  predictability  of  interest  rates  was 
unchanged,  as  measured  by  the  Fed’s  own  forecasts,  private  sector  forecasts  of  future  interest  rates 
improved significantly and in a manner consistent with the presence of policy inertia. 
 
VI  Narrative Evidence on Policy Changes 
The source of the inertia in interest rates could in principle be identified from policymakers themselves.  
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue a full narrative history of the motives behind each 
policy  change  during  the  Greenspan  era,  we  present  suggestive  evidence  which  illustrates  that 
policymakers  explicitly  formulated  their  policy  decisions  in  line  with  the  interest  smoothing 
interpretation.  As a particularly revealing example, we first focus on the March 22
nd, 1994 meeting of the 
FOMC.  After a year of the target Federal Funds Rate remaining at 3%, the Federal Reserve began a 
prolonged  period  of  increasing  target  rates  in  February  of  1994  in  response  to  rising  inflationary 
                                                      
6 The November 14
th, 2007 speech by Bernanke (available on the Fed’s website) describes past and current changes 
in Federal Reserve disclosures. 18 
 
pressures, culminating in a target rate of 6% in 1995.  During the March 22
nd meeting, the discussion 
among FOMC members concentrated on the question of how high and how rapidly rates should rise.
7   
  Chairman Greenspan began this discussion by highlighting his preferred action and reasons, 
“My own view is that eventually we have to be at 4 to 4-1/2 percent.  The question is not whether 
but when.  If we are to move 50 basis points, I think we would create far more instability than we 
realize,  largely  because  a  half-point  is  not  enough  to  remove  the  question  of  where  we  are 
ultimately  going.    I  think  there  is  a  certain  advantage  in  doing  25  basis  points  because  the 
markets, having seen two moves in a row of 25 basis points at a meeting, will tend almost surely 
to expect that the next move will be at the next meeting – or at least I think the probability of that 
occurring is probably higher than 50/50.  If that is the case and the markets perceive that – and 
they perceive we are going to 4 percent by midyear, moving only at meetings – then we have 
effectively removed the Damocles Sword because our action becomes predictable with respect to 
timing as well as with respect to dimension.” 
This statement contains the key ingredients of the interest smoothing motive: the Chairman has a desired 
target rate in mind based on his expectations of future macroeconomic conditions and suggests moving to 
toward that target in a sequence of small incremental steps to stabilize the private sector’s expectations.  
The subsequent discussion by other FOMC members illustrates similar considerations.  For example, 
Governor Lindsey offered the following justification for his agreement with the Chairman, 
“We definitely want to send a signal to the market, and I think that there are two ways of doing 
that.  One, which is not an option before us, is to go to a number that is a credible – a round 
number  that  people  would  say  is  the  natural  rate.    One  might  contemplate  a  75  basis  point 
increase to 4 percent.  I’m not recommending that, but one could suggest that.  It would be clear 
to market participants that we had stopped.  Going to 3.75 percent in my mind doesn’t indicate 
anything.  It doesn’t suggest that we are going to stop at 4 percent; it doesn’t suggest that we are 
going to stop at 4-1/4 percent; it doesn’t suggest that we are going to stop at 4-1/2 percent.  It 
does suggest that we have another increase coming down the road.  Since I don’t think a 75 basis 
point move is credible and I don’t think 50 basis points sends the signal of certainty, I found your 
suggestion of 25 basis points preferable…  So, while I have no disagreement at all that we want 
to get there as quickly as possible, in my mind a move of 25 basis points now, 25 in May and 25 
on July 5
th seems to be a pattern that will get us there in splendid time.  No one can accuse us of 
upsetting the markets, and we will establish more certainty in the market that we are headed to a 
fixed point that is higher than I think we would achieve with 50 basis points.” 
Governor Lindsey’s statement is particularly illustrative because he explicitly considers the possibility of 
moving interest rates immediately to the desired rate, but rejects it out of hand as “not an option” and “not 
credible”.  Like Greenspan, he emphasizes the stabilizing effect on market expectations of a gradual 
adjustment of interest rates.  President Stern of the Minneapolis Fed suggests an alternative justification, 
“As most people have already stated, it certainly seems appropriate to act now.  How far we 
ought to go and how fast we ought to try and get there, are the difficult questions.  My best 
judgment is that we’ll be at this for some time; it may well be that the funds rate has to go to 4 
percent or more by the time we are done.  But I don’t have a strong conviction about how far we 
will need to go.  As for the timing issue, it seems to me that we are probably going to be at this 
                                                      
7 The minutes of FOMC meetings are available on the website of the Federal Reserve Board. 19 
 
until we are either more confident than we are today that we have established an environment for 
renewed disinflation or until we actually see renewed disinflation.  It may surprise us and occur 
earlier or something else may happen that changes our view about appropriate policy.  But having 
said all that, I think we should bear in mind, and I’m certainly willing to be humble about all this, 
that the confidence interval around any forecast is very wide.  And I think that argues for caution.  
So, I’m comfortable with your ¼ point recommendation now.  I think that is the appropriate 
magnitude.” 
While Chairman Greenspan and Governor Lindsey emphasize the stabilizing effects of gradualism on 
market  expectations,  President  Stern  expresses  concern  about  the  uncertainty  surrounding  future 
conditions  and  views  that  as  justifying  “caution”  in  altering  policy.    This  motivation,  originally 
formalized  in  Brainard  (1967),  was  also  emphasized  by  Alan  Blinder  (1998)  (who  served  as  Vice-
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board during part of this time period) as a guiding strategy for monetary 
policymakers after he left the FOMC, 
“Step 1:  Estimate how much you need to tighten or loosen monetary policy to “get it right.” 
Then, do less. 
Step 2:   Watch developments. 
Step 3a: If  things  work  out  about  as  expected,  increase  your  tightening  or  loosening  toward 
where you thought it should be in the first place. 
Step 3b: If the economy seems to be evolving differently from what you expected, adjust policy 
accordingly.” 
  Furthermore,  while  some  members  of  this  particular  FOMC  meeting  disagreed  with  the 
policy  advocated  by  Greenspan  in  favor  of  a  more  aggressive  response  to  rising  inflationary 
pressures, none advocated a complete adjustment to the desired rate and instead called for a larger 
increase of 50 basis points.  Thus, no FOMC member proposed to act in a manner inconsistent with 
the interest smoothing motive; any disagreement was about the degree of interest smoothing.  The 
statement by President Boehne of the Philadelphia Fed makes this clear, 
“Well, I think the case for a less accommodative policy today is quite persuasive.  We did press 
hard  on  the  monetary  accelerator  to  get  the  economy  moving,  and  now  as  the  economy 
approaches cruising speed we have to ease off the accelerator to avoid having to slam on the 
brakes down the road.  The real issue – the major issue as you point out, Mr. Chairman – is how 
much to move.  I prefer a ½ percentage point increase in the federal funds rate compared to ¼ 
because I think we have some distance to go to get to a neutral policy, and it’s better to cover that 
distance earlier rather than later.” 
Other narrative evidence suggests that this characterization of monetary policy decisions is representative 
of other periods as well.  For example, Stephen Axilrod was responsible for presenting and defending policy 
alternatives (i.e. the Bluebooks) at FOMC meetings from the time of Burns to the end of Volcker’s tenure.  In 
describing the policy-making process that he observed for over a decade, he relates (Axilrod 2009), 
“[Policymakers] have an inherent disposition to conservatism in decision making.  They usually 
prefer to adjust policies gradually, which is a far from irrational way of operating.  Given all of 20 
 
the  uncertainties they  face,  gradual  changes  more  often than  not  guard them  against finding 
themselves too far off base when circumstances turn unexpectedly.” 
Similarly, in his 2004 speech on monetary policy inertia (which he refers to as “gradualism”), then-
Governor Bernanke indicated a preference for the inertial policy interpretation of historical Fed actions
8 
“My sense … is that policymakers’ caution in the face of many forms of uncertainty and their 
desire to make policy as predictable as possible both contribute to the gradualist behavior we 
seem to observe in practice.” 
Bernanke’s views are, of course, particularly important because they are indicative of how important 
policy inertia is likely to be during the recovery from the Great Recession.  While no detailed transcripts 
are available from recent FOMC meetings, his presence on the Board of Governors between 2002 and 
2005 implies that one can study both his public statements as well as views expressed in FOMC meetings 
to get a sense of how he characterized the policy choices facing the Fed during this time.  Because interest 
rates were at historic lows in 2003 and early 2004 (the FFR was at 1%) in response to the jobless recovery 
and the possibility of deflation, this time period also bears some similarities to current times.  Bernanke’s 
May 20
th speech in 2004 on policy inertia preceded the first in a long line of interest rate increases by a 
month and was clearly, at least ex-post, meant to serve as an indicator of the likely path of policy in the 
coming months and years, a path which he implied in “Fed speak” was going to follow the historical 
pattern of monetary policy inertia 
“As I have discussed today, given the highly uncertain environment in which policy operates, a 
gradual adjustment of rates has the advantage of allowing the FOMC to monitor the evolution of 
the economy and the effects of its policy actions, making adjustments along the way as needed.  
On the margin, a more gradual process may also help ease the transition to higher rates for 
participants in money markets and bond markets, as well as for households, banks, and firms.  In 
my own view, economic developments over the next year are reasonably likely to be consistent 
with a gradual adjustment of policy.” 
In FOMC meetings, Bernanke was more direct.  In the June 29
th-30
th, 2004 meeting in which the first 
25bp increase in the FFR was announced (the FFR would eventually rise by 400 bp over the next two 
years), he stated “Given these uncertainties, it seems to me that the best tactic is to temporize, embarking 
on a program of gradual rate increases but remaining alert and ready to adjust in response to incoming 
information.”  In the August 10
th meeting, he argued “Overall, our plan to tighten at a measured pace 
looks pretty good right now.  The gradualist approach moves us predictably toward rate neutrality yet 
leaves  the  economy  some  breathing  space  and  gives  us  time  to  observe  economic  developments.”  
Finally, in the September 21
st, 2004 FOMC meeting, Bernanke provided the following assessment of the 
previous and future path of interest rates, 
                                                      
8 The equivalence between “gradualism” as used by Bernanke and our terminology is clearly laid out in Bernanke’s 
speech: “This relatively slow adjustment of the policy rate has been referred to variously as interest-rate smoothing, 
partial adjustment, and monetary policy inertia.  In today’s talk, I will use the term gradualism.” 21 
 
“Overall, I think our strategy of removing accommodation at a measured pace has worked out 
well, not only in providing support to the economy and avoiding nasty surprises in financial 
markets but also in allowing us time to assess ongoing developments.  I support our plan of 
measured withdrawal of emergency stimulus…  As we go forward, however, we should remain 
flexible in slowing or speeding up the process as dictated by incoming data.  Financial markets 
are well prepared for this type of flexibility, and I believe it fits well with our declared strategy of 
removing accommodation at a measured but not mechanistic pace.” 
Thus,  the  narrative  evidence  is  also  supportive  of  a  clear  historical  role  for  policy  inertia  in  the 
decision-making process of the Federal Reserve.  The statements from Bernanke in mid-2004 when the 
Federal Reserve began raising interest rates indicate that he advocated this style of policy-adjustment.  
The opening quote from the October 20
th, 2010 FOMC meeting’s minutes expressing that “In current 
circumstances, however, most [FOMC participants] saw advantages to a more incremental approach 
that would involve smaller changes …  calibrated to incoming data.” is clearly reminiscent of the 
language employed in 2004 and therefore strongly suggests that the Bernanke Fed will, in the absence 
of a dramatic change in economic conditions, follow a very similar qualitative policy path. 
 
VII  Omitted Variables and the Persistence of Interest Rates 
While much of the evidence strongly supports the interest smoothing motive over the persistent monetary 
policy shocks explanation of interest rate persistence, a broader interpretation of the latter is difficult to 
rule out.  For example, Rudebusch (2002, 2006) suggests that the excess persistence in interest rates is 
most likely to come from historical responses of the central bank to factors not typically included in the 
Taylor rule.  Credit conditions are one particularly prominent example of such an omitted factor likely to 
elicit a central bank response, and their exclusion from standard Taylor rules could give the appearance of 
either  inertial  policy  or  persistent  shocks.    Similarly,  the  gradual  adjustment  of  the  central  bank’s 
information  set,  and  their  need  to  adjust  policy  based  on  their  revised  estimates  of  the  state  of  the 
economy, could point to either policy inertia or persistent shocks.  In this section, we consider a variety of 
factors which, when omitted from the estimated reaction function of the central bank, could lead to the 
appearance of excessive interest rate persistence. 
  We first consider the role of credit and asset price conditions.  These are particularly likely to have 
played an important historical role in affecting interest decisions.  For example, the October 1987 stock 
market crash led the Federal Reserve to lower the effective FFR by fifty basis points between October 19
th 
and  October  20
th  and  engage  in  a  variety  of  other  activities to  maintain  liquidity  in  financial  markets 
(Carlson  2007).    To  assess  whether  credit  and  asset  market  conditions  can  account  for  either  interest 
smoothing or persistent shocks, we consider estimates of equation (3) augmented with lagged measures of 
financial conditions using quarterly data from 1987Q4 to 2004Q4.  We use three such measures: 1) the 
spread between Moody’s Baa corporate bond rate and the ten-year U.S. treasury note, 2) the log of the 22 
 
quarterly average of the S&P500 index, and 3) Bloom’s (2009) measure of financial market uncertainty.  
Table 7 presents empirical estimates of our baseline Taylor rule allowing for two lags of interest smoothing, 
a  second  order  autoregressive  process  for  the  error  term,  and  our  three  measures  of  financial  market 
conditions.  All three measures are insignificantly different from zero and have no qualitative effects on 
interest smoothing and shock persistence.  Thus, there is little evidence that systematic responses by the 
Federal Reserve to financial market conditions, above and beyond their effects on expectations of current 
and future macroeconomic conditions, account for the persistence in interest rates in the data. 
  An alternative explanation could come from imperfect information on the part of the central bank.  
Because of lags in the release of data as well as data revisions, the Fed can revise its forecasts of the 
current state by significant amounts.  Interest rate changes could therefore arise not just from changes in 
the  central  bank’s  expectations  about  future  economic  developments  but  also  from  revisions  to  its 
expectations about the current state.  To assess whether this source of interest rate changes could account 
for the excess persistence in interest rates, we follow Romer and Romer (2004) and augment the baseline 
Taylor rule with revisions in the central bank’s forecasts of inflation, output growth and the output gap.  
Results from this specification are in Table 7.  As with financial market controls, we find no evidence of a 
systematic response to forecast revisions and controlling for these measures does not alter the relative 
importance of interest smoothing and persistent shocks. 
  A third possible explanation for the excess persistence in interest rates relative to simple Taylor 
rule predictions is persistent variation in the central bank’s target rates of inflation, output gap and output 
growth.  In the baseline specifications of the Taylor rule, each of these targets is assumed to be constant 
and integrated into the intercept of the regression.  However, Boivin (2006), Kozicky and Tinsley (2009) 
and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) estimate versions of the baseline Taylor rule with time-varying 
coefficients and document non-trivial changes in the intercept, and therefore in the targets of the FOMC.
9  
Kozicki and Tinsley (2009) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) further document that, controlling for 
time-variation in both the intercept and the response coefficients, the degree of interest-smoothing after 
the early 1980s has remained high, statistically significant, and stable.  Since much of this time-variation 
in targets is likely to emanate from changes in the inflation target, we consider estimates of equation (3) 
in which we replace the measure of expected inflation with a measure of the expected deviation of 
inflation from a time-varying target.  We employ three measures of the target rate of inflation: 1) Cogley 
et  al.’s  (2010)  measure  extracted  from  a  VAR  with  drifting  parameters  and  stochastic  volatility;  2) 
Coibion  and  Gorodnichenko’s  (2011)  measure  extracted  from  Taylor  rule  estimates  with  drifting 
parameters; and 3) Ireland’s (2007) measure constructed from an estimated New Keynesian dynamic 
                                                      
9 Time variation in the intercept can also reflect changes in the equilibrium real rate of interest, as in Trehan and Wu 
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stochastic  general  equilibrium  model.  Figure  4  plots  these  three  measures  of  target  inflation,  which 
exhibit broadly similar patterns despite the different approaches employed to estimate them.  By and 
large, Table 7 documents that in this alternative specification of the policy reaction function the serial 
correlation in the error terms becomes less important and for two out of three measures statistically 
insignificant.  The fit of this alternative specification is somewhat worse than the fit of the baseline 
specification  which  probably  reflects  the  fact  that  these  measures  of  the  target  inflation  rate  are 
constructed and may contain measurement errors. In any case, to the extent that these measures capture 
salient movements in the target inflation rate, these results support the hypothesis that serial correlation in 
the error term could be absorbing variation in the inflation target rate.     
  The final possibility that we consider is that the central bank responds not just to its expectations of 
current and future macroeconomic conditions but also to those of private sector agents.  There are several 
reasons why the central bank might wish to pursue such policies.  First, while the Federal Reserve’s 
forecasts are typically superior to those of professional forecasters, as documented by Romer and Romer 
(2000), policy-makers may be concerned about the quality of their forecasts when they differ substantially 
from those of other agents.  This could lead policymakers to respond less strongly to their own forecasts to 
hedge against the possibility that their forecasts are incorrect.  As a result, this phenomenon could also 
account for why actual interest rates appear to be less volatile than interest rates predicted from a Taylor 
rule employing only Greenbook forecasts.  Second, policymakers could be concerned about the effect of 
their  decisions  on  the  expectations  of  other  agents.    For  example,  if  the  central  bank  has  superior 
information  than  private  agents,  then  its  interest  rate  decisions  will  reveal  part  of  the  central  bank’s 
information to the rest of the population and therefore alter their expectations, as considered in e.g. Walsh 
(2010).  This could be potentially destabilizing: if the central bank is concerned about rising inflation but 
observes no movement in the private sector’s expectations of inflation, it could be optimal on the part of 
the central bank to avoid raising interest rates too rapidly so that agents do not infer from the policy actions 
that the central  bank  is concerned  about rising inflation, a result which  could exacerbate inflationary 
pressures as higher private sector inflation expectations would increase wage and price pressures.  Indeed, 
section VI shows that such arguments could be an important part of policy making at the Fed.  
  Figure  5  illustrates  the  deviations  in  the  Greenbook  forecasts  from  equivalent  forecasts  from 
professional forecasters in the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters for both inflation and 
output growth.  In addition, Figure 5 includes the residuals from the simple Taylor rule with no smoothing 
or persistent shocks, i.e. equation (1) in section 2.  There is a clear negative correlation between the Taylor 
rule residuals and the deviation of Greenbook forecasts from professional forecasts.  The periods in 1989, 
1995, 1998 and 2000-2001 when actual interest rates were above those predicted by the baseline Taylor 
rule all coincide with periods in which Greenbook forecasts of inflation were lower than professional 24 
 
forecasts of inflation, and the reverse pattern occurs in 1990, 1996, and late 2001 during which interest 
rates were below those predicted by the Taylor rule while professional forecasters were expecting lower 
inflation than staff members of the Fed’s Board of Governors.  The relationship between Taylor rule 
residuals and output growth forecast differentials may appear less systematic to the naked eye, but there are 
episodes where negative comovement is clear such as from 1991 to 1996 and again from 1998 to 2001.  
  We evaluate the statistical strength of these relationships by estimating equation (3) augmented 
with the difference between the Greenbook forecast of future inflation and that of professional forecasters 
in the Survey of Professional Forecasters, and the analogous measure for the difference in forecasts of 
contemporaneous output growth.  We do not control for potential differences in the estimates of the 
output gap between the Fed and professional forecasters because no forecast of the output gap is available 
for the latter.  The results, presented in Table 7, are consistent with the described mechanisms.  The 
coefficients  on  both  the  inflation  forecast  and  output  growth  forecast  differentials  are  negative  and 
statistically significant, indicating smaller interest rate changes when the Fed forecasts point to more 
expansionary and/or inflationary conditions than private sector forecasts.  Furthermore, controlling for 
these  informational  elements  eliminates  the  persistence  of  the  errors:  the  coefficients  on  both 
autoregressive parameters are insignificantly different from zero.  At the same time, the degree of interest 
smoothing is now well represented by an AR(1).   Thus, the higher order autoregressive process for 
interest  smoothing  may  have  been  capturing  the  central  bank’s  response  to  the  private  sector’s 
information set.  This suggests a novel potential explanation for deviations of actual interest rates from 
standard Taylor rule prescriptions.  Understanding the basis for this systematic response of monetary 
policymakers to private agents’ forecasts is an important topic for future research.   
 
VIII  Conclusion 
The way in which policymakers endogenously respond to economic fluctuations plays a key role in 
determining the dynamic effect of shocks to the economy.  Understanding the historical contribution of 
endogenous policy reactions to economic fluctuations therefore requires a careful characterization of the 
nature of policy decisions and the rate at which policy changes occur.  The gradual adjustment of interest 
rates  by  the  Federal  Reserve  is  one  issue  that  has  been  a  source  of  contention  among  monetary 
economists.  We provide novel evidence using a variety of methods that consistently supports the notion 
that inertia in monetary policy actions has indeed been a fundamental and deliberate component of the 
decision-making process by monetary policymakers.  More specifically, our evidence strongly favors 
interest-rate-smoothing theory over serially-correlated-policy-shocks theory as an explanation of highly 
persistent policy rates set by the Fed. 25 
 
This  result  has  several  important  implications.    First,  it should  help  guide  forecasters  in  more 
accurately predicting the path of future interest rates.  For example, the expected duration of near-zero 
interest rates and the pace at which interest rates will rise upon exiting the zero-bound hinge on the amount 
of monetary policy inertia.  In particular, Bernanke’s clear advocacy of a gradual rise in interest rates in 
2004 suggests that a similar policy path is likely to be followed in coming months and possibly years.  In 
addition, the extra uncertainty about the effects of new policy tools such as changing interest rates on 
reserves suggests that the incentive to be inertial will be particularly high during this period, as in Brainard 
(1967).  Second, assuming that policy inertia in interest rate decisions is likely to transfer to other monetary 
tools, the evidence provided in this paper indicates that the exit strategy with respect to tools other than 
interest rates is likely to be gradual, even if the economy recovers more rapidly than currently expected.  
Third, our results should help guide future research using structural macroeconomic models as to how best 
to formulate the endogenous response of monetary policymakers to endogenous economic fluctuations.  
Fourth, from a normative perspective, our results imply that the degree of policy inertia in historical Federal 
Reserve interest rate decisions, while large, is still significantly less than theory suggests would be optimal.   
In addition, two results in the paper are particularly noteworthy.  First, the superiority of the 
Greenbook  assumptions  about the path of future interest rates over financial  market and  professional 
forecasts  is  strongly  suggestive  of  important  informational  frictions  facing  these  agents,  as  found  in 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) in the case of inflation forecasts from both professional forecasters and 
financial markets.  Consistent with the presence of significant information rigidities, we document an 
increase in the ability of financial markets and professional forecasters to predict subsequent interest rate 
changes after the Federal Reserve began to release more detailed information about the basis for their 
interest rate decisions.  This suggests that further transparency on the part of the Federal Reserve, such as 
releasing its internal forecasts on a more frequent basis, could likely improve the ability of private sector 
agents to forecast future policy actions and help dampen market reactions to perceived policy surprises. 
 In a similar vein, the finding that the Federal Reserve systematically responds to deviations of its 
forecasts from those of private forecasters raises a number of questions that call for further research.  The 
most basic concerns the source of this relationship.  One potential explanation is that FOMC members are 
hedging  their  bets  when  private  sector  forecasts  differ  markedly  from  the  Greenbook  forecasts.  
Alternatively, this could reflect a desire on the part of FOMC members to reduce the possibility that 
private sector agents will draw conclusions from the Fed’s policy decisions that run counter to the Fed’s 
objectives.  For example, if the central bank’s forecasts of inflation exceed those of the private sector, 
preemptive tightening on the part of the Fed could reveal their expectation of inflation to the private sector, 
thereby  generating  additional  inflation  pressures  via  the  expectations  channel,  as  suggested  in  Walsh 26 
 
(2010).  Quantifying these mechanisms would yield a better understanding of the implications of imperfect 
information on the part of different economic agents, as well as their interaction. 
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Figure 1:  Target Federal Funds Rate and the Prediction of a Simple Taylor Rule 
 
Note: The figure plots the actual target FFR, the predicted FFR from equation (1) in section 2, and the 
residuals of the regression.  See section 2.1 for details. 
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Figure 2:  Target Federal Funds Rate and the Predictions of Augmented Taylor Rules 
 
Note: The figure plots the actual target FFR and the predicted FFR’s from estimating augmented versions 
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Figure 3:  Interest Rate Forecasts of the Fed, Financial Markets, and Professional Forecasters 
Panel A:   Forecasts of the FFR from Financial Markets and Greenbooks 
 
Panel B:   Forecasts of the 3-Month TBill Rate from Professional Forecasters and Greenbooks 
 
Note: The top figure plots the Federal Funds Rate (black solid line) and the forecasts from the first quarter 
of each year from financial markets using Eurodollar futures (red lines with triangles) and Greenbooks of 
the Federal Reserve (blue lines with circles).  The bottom figure plots the 3-month TBill rate (solid black 
line) and the forecasts from the first quarter of each year from the Survey of Professional Forecasters 
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Figure 4:  Measures of the Federal Reserve’s Target Inflation Rate 
 
Note: The figure plots the estimates of the annualized inflation target rate of the Federal Reserve from 
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Figure 5:  Deviations from the Taylor Rule and Forecast Differentials between Greenbooks and Professional Forecasters 
Panel A:  Inflation Forecast Differentials            Panel B: Output Growth Forecast Differentials 
   
Note: Each figure plots the residuals from the simple Taylor rule in equation (1) in the text, which represent the deviation of actual interest rates 
from predicted interest rates using only Greenbook forecasts of inflation, output growth, and the output gap.  Panel A also includes the difference 
between the Greenbook forecast of inflation over the next two quarters and the equivalent median forecast from professional forecasts in the SPF.  
Panel B includes the difference between the Greenbook forecast of output growth in the current quarter and the equivalent median forecast from 
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Table 1:  Taylor Rule Estimates Nesting Interest Smoothing and Persistent Shocks 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  :    ,   |   0.37***    0.48***  0.27***   
  (0.06)    (0.08)  (0.08)   
  :    |     0.25***       
    (0.05)       
  :  |           -0.00 
          (0.05) 
  :  |   0.16***  0.13***  0.25***  0.32***  0.25*** 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
   :   |   0.12***  0.14***      0.07** 
  (0.02)  (0.03)      (0.03) 
   :     |       0.10***     
      (0.03)     
  :      0.81***  0.87***  0.72***  0.65***  0.74*** 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.09) 
  :      0.46***  0.44***  0.59***  0.85***  0.89*** 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
R
2  0.989  0.988  0.988  0.987  0.987 
s.e.e.  0.246  0.258  0.257  0.270  0.274 
AIC  0.120  0.213  0.206  0.292  0.330 
SIC  0.314  0.407  0.401  0.454  0.524 
 
 
Notes:  The table presents OLS estimates of the Taylor Rule equation (2) in section 2.2 of the text.     is 
the short-run response to inflation expectations,    is the short-run response to the expected output gap, 
and     is the short-run response to expected output growth.     is the estimated degree of interest 
smoothing  while      is  the  persistence  of  monetary  policy  shocks.    All  estimates  are  done  using 
Greenbook forecasts from 1987Q4 until 2004Q4.   *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using Newey-West HAC standard errors.  See section 2.2 for 
details. 
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Table 2:  Taylor Rules Nesting Interest Smoothing and Persistent Shocks for Different Time 
Samples 















  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
  :    ,   |   0.37***  0.35***  0.35***  0.26***  0.19***  0.20*** 
  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
  :  |   0.16***  0.15***  0.08***  0.09***  0.07***  0.05*** 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
   :   |   0.12***  0.11***  0.20***  0.09***  0.08***  0.12*** 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
  :      0.81***  0.80***  0.87***  0.88***  0.90***  0.92*** 
  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
  :      0.46***  0.46***  0.19  0.07  0.02  0.18* 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.09) 
R
2  0.989  0.981  0.981    0.992  0.986  0.989 
s.e.e.  0.246  0.260  0.359    0.210  0.218  0.266 
AIC  0.120  0.256  0.856    -0.241  -0.148  0.220 
SIC  0.314  0.488  1.029    -0.114  0.010  0.331 
Notes:  The table presents OLS estimates of the Taylor Rule equation (2) in section 2.2 of the text.     is 
the short-run response to inflation expectations,    is the short-run response to the expected output gap, 
and     is the short-run response to expected output growth.     is the estimated degree of interest 
smoothing  while      is  the  persistence  of  monetary  policy  shocks.    *,**,  and  ***  denote  statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using Newey-West HAC standard errors.  See 





Table 3:  Information Criteria Selection of Interest Rate Smoothing vs Persistent Shocks 
 
  87Q4-04Q4    87Q4-99Q4    83Q1-04Q4 
  IS  AR  BIC    IS  AR  BIC    IS  AR  BIC 
Panel A: Quarterly data                       
  
∗ =   +         ,    +          +         2  0  0.116    2  0  0.365    2  0  0.983 
  
∗ =   +          +          +         2  0  0.193    2  0  0.405    2  0  1.064 
  
∗ =   +         ,    +            +         2  0  0.274    2  0  0.480    2  0  1.279 
  
∗ =   +         ,    +         1  1  0.454    1  1  0.556    1  1  1.239 
  
∗ =   +        +          +         2  0  0.447    2  0  0.468    3  0  1.131 
                       
Panel B: Data by FOMC meeting                       
  
∗ =   +         ,    +          +         1  0  -0.146    1  0  -0.036    1  1  0.331 
  
∗ =   +          +          +         1  0  -0.083    1  0  0.012    1  1  0.385 
  
∗ =   +         ,    +            +         3  0  -0.256    3  0  -0.158    1  1  0.464 
  
∗ =   +         ,    +         3  0  0.004    2  2  0.034    3  2  0.603 
  
∗ =   +        +          +         2  0  0.065    1  0  -0.086    1  1  0.414 
                       
 
Notes:  The table presents the results from specification searches over equation (3) in the text allowing for 
up to 4 lags of interest smoothing and 4 lags of persistent shocks.  For each time period and interest rate 
rule, we report the preferred specification using the BIC in terms of number of lags for interest smoothing 
(IS), number of lags for persistent monetary policy shocks (AR) and the BIC statistic associated with the 
selected specification.  Bold values indicate the preferred specification of the Taylor rule according to the 
















Table 4:  Estimates of Taylor Rules with Higher Order Nested Specifications 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  :    ,   |   0.39***    0.50***  0.46***   
  (0.05)    (0.06)  (0.07)   
  :    |     0.35***       
    (0.05)       
  :  |           0.11** 
          (0.05) 
  :  |   0.11***  0.11***  0.18***  0.16***  0.04 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
   :   |   0.13***  0.13***      0.17*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)      (0.03) 
   :     |       0.11***     
      (0.04)     
  , :      1.22***  1.26***  1.21***  1.30***  1.31*** 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.14) 
  , :      -0.40***  -0.41***  -0.45***  -0.55***  -0.36*** 
  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.12) 
  , :      -0.01  -0.08  0.00  0.01  0.13 
  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.20) 
  , :      -0.30***  -0.36***  -0.19*  -0.31***  0.06 
  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.11) 
R
2  0.992  0.992  0.990  0.987  0.988 
s.e.e.  0.217  0.222  0.241  0.268  0.266 
SIC  0.148  0.199  0.363  0.528  0.558 
AIC  -0.111  -0.060  0.104  0.302  0.299 
 
Notes:  The table presents estimates of equation (3) in the text assuming two lags of the interest rate for 
the interest smoothing component (  ,  and   , ) and an autoregressive process for the error term of order 
2 (  ,  and   , ).  All estimates are quarterly, done using Greenbook forecasts, and over the period 
1987Q4  to  2004Q4.    *,**,  and  ***  denote  statistical  significance  at  the  10%,  5%  and  1%  levels 








Table 5: Instrumental Variable Estimation of the Taylor Rule 










  (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
  :    ,   |   0.42***  0.58***    0.34***  0.57*** 
  (0.05)  (0.14)    (0.07)  (0.13) 
  :  |   0.14***  0.14    0.07***  0.08** 
  (0.02)  (0.09)    (0.01)  (0.03) 
   :   |   0.18***  0.28***    0.22***  0.28*** 
  (0.03)  (0.05)    (0.02)  (0.04) 
  :      0.82***  0.80***    0.88***  0.80*** 
  (0.03)  (0.10)    (0.03)  (0.05) 
R
2  0.988  0.981    0.981  0.953 
s.e.e.  0.262  0.328    0.361  0.567 
AIC  0.225      0.857   
SIC  0.387      0.998   
 
Notes:  The table presents OLS and IV estimates of the Taylor rule in equation (3) in the text.  In columns 
(2) and (4), instruments include a constant and two lags of technology shocks from Gali (1999), TFP 
residuals from Basu, Fernald and Kimball (2004), oil supply shocks from Kilian (2008), news shocks 
from Beaudry and Portier (2006), and fiscal shocks from Romer and Romer (2010). *,**, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using Newey-West HAC standard 
errors.  See section 4 for details. 
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Table 6: The Predictability of Interest Rate Changes 
 
  1987Q4-1999Q4    1987Q4-2004Q4 
       −          −            −              −          −            −      
  (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
               
Euro-dollar forecasts   0.81***  0.44**  0.35    0.99***  0.70***  0.47 
of FFR  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.29)    (0.11)  (0.22)  (0.30) 
R
2  0.563  0.110  0.032    0.676  0.203  0.050 
               
Greenbook forecasts   1.21***  0.95***  1.02**  1.29***  0.96***  1.00** 
of FFR  (0.16)  (0.24)  (0.50)  (0.12)  (0.22)  (0.44) 
R
2  0.653  0.196  0.115  0.703  0.159  0.088 
             
SPF forecasts                  1.45***  0.65  0.30  1.69***  0.85*  0.54 
of 3mo T-Bills  (0.36)  (0.64)  (0.53)  (0.29)  (0.46)  (0.36) 
R
2  0.330  0.042  0.010  0.425  0.066  0.040 
             
Greenbook forecasts   1.13***  0.79***  0.97*  1.15***  0.86***  1.00** 
of 3mo T-Bills  (0.16)  (0.25)  (0.53)  (0.11)  (0.21)  (0.47) 
R
2  0.527  0.145  0.121  0.562  0.135  0.095 
 
Notes: The table reports estimates of equation (8) in the text.  The reported coefficients are for the slope 
of  expected  changes  in  future  interest  rates  on  the  ex-post  changes  in  interest  rates  for  forecasting 
horizons ranging from one quarter to three quarters.  *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using Newey-West HAC standard errors.  See section 5 for details. 
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Table 7: Omitted Variables and the Persistence of Interest Rates  
Dependent variable:     (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  :    ,   |   0.39***  0.31***  0.36**  0.51***       
  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)       
  :    ,   |  −   
∗          0.23***  0.28***  0.32*** 
          (0.06)  (0.10)  (0.07) 
   :   |   0.13***  0.12***  0.12***  0.15***  0.17***  0.18***  0.17*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
  :  |   0.11***  0.13***  0.11***  0.16***  0.03  -0.01  0.03* 
  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
   :      1.22***  1.17***  1.24***  0.98***  1.28***  1.31***  1.31*** 
  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
   :      -0.40***  -0.35***  -0.40***  -0.19  -0.35***  -0.34***  -0.36*** 
  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
   :      -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.19  0.20  0.20  0.12 
  (0.14)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
   :      -0.30***  -0.26***  -0.29***  -0.08  -0.06  -0.02  -0.18* 
  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11) 
BLOOMSHOCKS       0.20           
    (0.57)           
SPREAD       -0.02           
    (0.08)           
S& 500       -0.16           
    (0.12)           
    ,   |  −     ,   |         0.14         
      (0.11)         
   |  −    |         -0.01         
      (0.04)         
  |  −   |         0.01         
      (0.06)         
    ,   |  −     ,   | 
            -0.31**       
        (0.14)       
   |  −    | 
           -0.11***       
        (0.04)       
R
2  0.992  0.992  0.992  0.993  0.988  0.988  0.989 
s.e.e.  0.217  0.219  0.219  0.210  0.253  0.260  0.248 
AIC  -0.111  -0.058  -0.048  -0.148  0.200  0.256  0.163 
SIC  0.148  0.298  0.307  0.176  0.459  0.515  0.426 
 
Notes: Target inflation rate   
∗ in columns (5), (6), and (7) are taken from Cogley et al. (2010), Coibion 
and Gorodnichenko (2011), and Ireland (2007) respectively.     ,   | 
     and    | 
    are mean forecasts of 
inflation  (two  quarters  ahead)  and  output  growth  rate  (current  quarter)  reported  in  the  Survey  of 
Professional  Forecasters.    BLOOMSHOCKS  are  Bloom’s  (2009)  measure  of  financial  uncertainty, 
SPREAD  is  the  difference  between  Moody’s  corporate  Baa  bonds  and  10-year  Treasury  notes,  and 
S&P500 is the log of the quarterly average of the S&P 500 index.  *,**, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, using Newey-West HAC standard errors.  See 
section 7 for details. 